Observed 9 September 2026. Bounded lineage run after the recorded assurance forest review. Draft legal operation and access are separate companion notes.
Australia's official statutory review, section 5.5, printed p53, attributes the overarching duty-of-care conception to Lorna Woods and William Perrin. It cites Carnegie UK's 2019 model bill and its 2021 criticism of the narrower UK scheme, then favors a singular Australian duty. It directly quotes Reset.Tech Australia's submission70 when explaining why content-specific duties would be insufficient. This is recipient-side acknowledgment of models and submitted reasoning, stronger than a shared vocabulary or conference roster. It does not allocate final clause authorship to those advocates. Source: http[local research file] . Reading scope: primary indexed section5.5 text and footnotes34-38; full PDF reader exceeded13MB limit and both ordinary downloads timed out, so no full-report reading or original custody claimed.
Carnegie UK's January2022 submission to Australia's House Select Committee says its clerk invited the submission. It proposes platform risk assessment, mitigation and ongoing supervision, with a stronger regulator and cross-border cooperation. Its envisaged interventions include changes to visibility, forwarding and message prompts, while acknowledging expression and proportionality. That is documented historical submission and intended mechanism, not proof each intervention was enacted. Source: http[local research file] . All six pages read in web rendering, especially paragraphs1,9,19-23. The document itself dates January2022 despite misleading search metadata.
The Online Safety Act Network's June2024 submission68 names Maeve Walsh as lead and Lorna Woods as principal adviser. It explicitly promotes Australian alignment with UK/EU regulation to strengthen regulators against multinational firms. Its approach covers design, operation, resourcing and business models, while warning that systems measures and content interventions cannot be completely separated. It also warns against unnecessary overmoderation and stresses privacy-by-design. Source: http[local research file] . Entire ten-page substantive rendering read. This is an advocate's proposal; the government host is not government endorsement of every statement.
A further direct working relationship is a jointly authored 22April2024 article by Rys Farthing and Woods advocating a singular Australian duty and discussing the UK divergence. The author disclosure says Reset Australia received organizational support from Reset Global, Luminate and Internet Society Foundation at that time. It does not identify a grant commissioning this article or funding Woods personally. Its claim about technology companies preferring the narrower scheme is author interpretation, not a recovered company instruction. Source: http[local research file] . Full substantive body/bylines/disclosure read. Hosted outlet identity may have changed; preserve date and original authors rather than treating this as a new2026 article.
Reset's submission70 explicitly names Woods/Perrin's model and covers access/content creation, discovery, user tools and platform tools. Its singular-duty argument appears on printed pp4-5; later printed p26 proposes vetted researcher access including third-sector organizations. That is a potential institutional-benefit design, not an awarded right to Reset or proof of control over platform data. Source: http[local research file] . Scoped passages PDF6-7 and PDF28, not complete31-page reading.
Reset.Tech Australia's own2024 transparency report describes a duty-of-care roundtable, paper, small advocacy coalition, review submissions and parliamentary evidence. Its finance page lists Reset.Tech(US), Internet Society Foundation, Susan McKinnon Foundation, Boundless Foundation, Manniferra (spelling as printed), an unnamed private donor, and NSW Government support specifically for attendance at the social-media summit. No amounts or award terms appear there. This is recipient-reported funding; it cannot attribute the duty campaign's expenses to any particular donor, treat summit travel support as state commissioning, or establish donor editorial rights. Sources: http[local research file] , printed pp6,37-38 and scoped project passages. Not read cover-to-cover. The2024 funding roster differs from the earlier article's roster; do not conflate periods or infer withdrawal.
Current naming needs care: the former Online Safety Act Network announced its change to Online Safety Network on1September2026, expressly expanding attention to AI and emerging technologies. It retains focus on online-safety implementation while advocating product-safety regulation for AI chatbots and broader digital regulation. This is explicit organizational scope expansion, not an inferred AI connection from a name. Sources: http[local research file] (full body) and http[local research file] (current mission/leadership; logo carousel is not a funding or control record).
This is a documented transfer and adaptation of regulatory ideas: model authors and UK civil-society coordination, collaboration with Australian advocates, recipient-side citation, then a draft legislative process. It gives the campaign a concrete UK/Australia bridge. It also preserves the substantive disagreement: advocates wanted a broader duty than the eventual UK implementation, and Australia's draft must be assessed on its own clauses. The material does not connect the September2026 draft to ControlAI direction or a common financial command.
Prior local kidron-money.md records an Indigo grant to5Rights and William Perrin's trustee/grant-governance role; that is a useful older money lead, not refreshed here. Indigo's current biography returned a redirect page. No new financial edge should rely on that failed refresh. The most discriminating remaining records are the review's drafting correspondence and submission-response matrix, contemporary consultation invitations/version logs, and the grant agreements funding the relevant Australian advocacy work. Public statements alone do not resolve approval rights or earmarking.
The user's autonomy objection supplies a concrete audit question: does each obligation protect a user's ability to choose, or permit another institution to suppress a lawful choice without that user's agreement? The mechanism must be answered clause by clause, keeping stated aims separate from foreseeable effects.