Acquisition closed on 9 September 2026 at three substantive donor-side records: written answer 149420, the CDMD 2022–2023 programme summary, and one September 2022 spending entry. The programme original is retained; the parliamentary answer and spending entry have scoped official-reader derivatives. The findings do not identify a signed GDI grant agreement, its grant number, or clauses controlling publication, intellectual property or commercial reuse.
In written answer 149420, answered 24 February 2023, FCDO minister Leo Docherty says the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme had funded GDI since 2019 for activities outside the US. He reports GBP 1,999,026 between 2019 and 2022, with a further GBP 600,797 in the then-current financial year. These are donor-reported amounts provided, not an independently reconciled payment ledger or merely a future award announcement. The answer does not identify individual disbursements or the precise period boundaries of the first amount. Neither amount should be added to the separate spending entry below.
Asked about discussions, the answer says there “will have been frequent contact” between the programme team and GDI, and regular performance reports and reviews. This describes the department's expected programme relationship; it supplies neither an actual meeting count nor the reports, instructions or review decisions. It does not establish a right to approve a particular rating, selection of a particular publisher, or customer purchasing decisions. Its explanation places GDI's technological work in the context of countering Russian disinformation.
Source: [official answer 149420](http[local research file] question and entire answer; reader lines 24–37, date line 32. Original GET returned 403 and was closed. fcdo-answer149420.reader.txt retains the working official-reader text; the retained error HTML is not substantive source content.
The outside-US wording is a consequential statement of funded-activity scope. Without the agreement, it is not a demonstrated contractual prohibition on every later use of knowledge, code or data in US markets. Conversely, commercial availability elsewhere does not show that FCDO commissioned US exclusions.
The official Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme Summary 2022 to 2023 gives identifier CSSF-05-000006, a seven-year programme running April 2016–March 2023, with FCDO and Cabinet Office partners. It identifies the Baltic States, Central Europe and Eastern Neighbourhood as the programme's operating region. Its FY 2022–2023 allocation is GBP 12 million ODA and GBP 21.1 million non-ODA. These are programme allocations; they are not GDI's income, an additional GDI award or demonstrated expenditure.
Its component table covers independent media/civil society, vulnerable audiences, partner capabilities, strategic communications with monitoring/evaluation/research, and programme delivery. Most implementers and contract dates are recorded generically as Various; the partner-capability component lists HMG and 1 April 2022–31 March 2023. GDI is not named in the summary. The objectives include analysing and exposing information operations, strengthening independent media and audience resilience, and international coordination. Expected results are aims, not evidence they occurred.
This summary establishes the parent programme's identity and strategic envelope. It cannot allocate GDI to a component, establish its country list, or supply a GDI-specific deliverable or approval condition. Its duration also cannot substitute for the individual grant term even though its March 2023 endpoint is consistent with the recipient's reported grant expiry.
Source: [original ODT](http[local research file] entire document text, particularly identity/duration/budget fields, component table and support/results headings. Retained fcdo-cdmd2022-23.odt, SHA-256 c384de3682c5328fdb40642321b3733fcfcae23b6c0f7aee183e2785b9d5bc94. Read from its XML text; no rendered-page or visual claim. Metadata says three pages and 4 November 2024 creation/modification. The [official attachment index](http[local research file] was published 30 January 2025. This is a retrospectively published summary, not proof that these exact bytes were the governing instrument in 2022. The index's general sensitivity rationale for withholding some programme detail is not proof that a specific GDI clause was withheld.
FCDO's September 2022 spending-over-GBP-25,000 publication contains this selected row:
| Field | Recorded value |
|---|---|
| Department / entity | FCDO / FCDO |
| GL.Date | 05/09/2022 |
| Unique.Identifier | 300,000,130,671,861 |
| Invoice.Line.Number | 1 |
| Supplier.Name | GLOBAL DISINFORMATION INDEX |
| Invoice.GBP.Line.AMT | GBP 130,506.00 |
| Category | Project Management |
This is a donor ledger/invoice-line record with a general-ledger date, not a recipient bank statement or proof of the exact settlement date. The row supplies no grant/programme identifier, deliverable or country. Its generic category must not be converted into an invented project-management contract. The identifier is a transaction-record identifier, not the grant number. The selected row is not a full annual reconciliation or evidence of the last payment.
Source: [official CSV preview](http[local research file] header and sole matched GDI row, reader lines 58–62 and 741. Preview says updated 28 November 2024, distinct from the September 2022 ledger period. fcdo-spend-sept2022.reader.txt retains these scoped passages. The CSV download reader failed; no original CSV was retained or another transport attempted.
The prior accepted FON0071 recipient disclosure says no UK funding since 2022, while its grant expired in March 2023. A September 2022 ledger date lies in both calendar 2022 and UK financial year 2022–2023. This demonstrates why the labels can coexist; it does not reconcile the two parliamentary amounts to receipts, allocate this row to either amount, or prove an exact last-funding date. The donor answer and the recipient account also describe programme participation using different start-period formulations; no unsupported reconciliation is imposed.
Read together with the earlier accepted product and recipient evidence, public funding of GDI's work and a commercial licensing operation are both documented at their respective source strengths. The missing causal instrument is what assets the commissioned work created and what reuse rights attached. The acquired records do not establish that donor-funded code or classifications were the same assets later licensed to Oracle or another buyer. Neither a tightly confined non-reusable commission nor unrestricted commercial reuse is proved.
The next useful record would be FCDO's executed GDI award/variation and deliverable schedule under CDMD, with the financial schedule, acceptance/review rights and IP/data/publication provisions; corresponding performance returns would distinguish reserved rights from exercised instructions. FCDO and GDI are the expected holders. A supplier-licence annex would then be needed to join any retained assets to commercial use. No request or contact has been made.
A finite official-domain search covered parliamentary answers, GOV.UK programme disclosures, DevTracker and exact GDI/grant-agreement/IP terms. Answer 171377 was surfaced for country scope, but its ordinary reader failed and direct GET returned 403; the route was closed and the indexed answer was not promoted to body-read evidence. Other spending months, programme versions, third-party discussions and government-country studies remain discovery only. Previously closed GDI/Jounce routes were not revisited. Full transport, read scopes and hashes are in fcdo-captures.json; no case, graph or publication was changed.