Closed 9 September 2026. Four submissions now establish a public UK advocacy trail before the previously inspected IPO forum account. The earliest internally dated Alliance document acquired in this pass is August 2020. This is not a claim that the Alliance invented KYBC or was its first proponent.
| Document and date boundary | Proposer → recorded recipient/venue | Decisive request and locator |
|---|---|---|
| [Alliance response to Digital Markets Taskforce](http[local research file] internally August 2020; CMA publication 8 December 2020 | Alliance for Intellectual Property → CMA Digital Markets Taskforce call for information | PDF 3, response to questions 5–8, seeks verification duties across critical business infrastructure, including providers without Strategic Market Status; it proposes hosting/payment-access consequences for illicit businesses ignoring self-disclosure. PDF 4 proposes a code-of-conduct/enforcement route. |
| [BPI response to the same call](http[local research file] labelled Redacted version November 2020 at PDF 18; CMA publication 8 December 2020 | BPI → CMA Digital Markets Taskforce | PDF 17, §4.2.2, proposes regular verification and service termination for withheld or incorrect information. PDF 6, §3, identifies intermediary categories; PDF 16 places the remedies under proposed codes and a duty of care. |
| [Alliance OSB0016](http[local research file] internally September 2021 | Alliance → Joint Committee on the Draft Online Safety Bill | PDF 2–3, The problem & potential solution, seeks KYBC duties for all business-infrastructure intermediaries, beyond the Bill's scope; an appropriate legislative vehicle and hosting/payment-access consequences. PDF 3 Summary asks Parliamentarians to press government. |
| [MPA FDF0068](http[local research file] internally 10 May 2022 at PDF 21; contains a briefing labelled September 2021 | MPA → Lords Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee; transmits a briefing from rightsholders on the Creative Industries Council IP subgroup | Main §§19–28, PDF 5–7, proposes identity verification and asks the Committee to encourage named departments into the IPO forum. Annex 2, PDF 9–13, supplies the rightsholder proposal, coverage and sanctions. |
The [CMA's original case index](http[local research file] Responses to call for information, explicitly links both 2020 responses with the 8 December publication date. Its timetable distinguishes the 1 July call launch and 31 July deadline from publication. The deadline is not the proven date of either submission. Alliance's August document date and BPI's November redacted-version date remain separate from the unacquired initial submission/receipt records. Publication by the recipient establishes entry into a policy process; it does not establish that the recipient accepted the requested rules.
Alliance's August 2020 response, PDF 1–2, explains why it sought a regulatory route: it regarded voluntary industry roundtables as slow and Online Harms proposals as excluding IP infringement. Its response to questions 5–8 expands beyond firms with Strategic Market Status; it seeks verification coupled with denial of critical infrastructure. The September 2021 submission repeats that demand in a different parliamentary venue and cites the Digital Markets Taskforce's December 2020 recommendation, G22(13b), to strengthen powers against unlawful activity causing economic detriment. This is an explicit citation and request for scrutiny, not proof that the Taskforce specifically adopted Alliance's KYBC design. Its assessment of the then-current e-commerce law remains attributed advocacy, not this packet's legal conclusion.
BPI's §4.2.2 specifies verified name, physical address, email and telephone; for legal entities, current director/responsible-person information, with bank-detail checks suggested where appropriate. Records would be checked regularly. Its proposed consequence attaches to withheld or incorrect information, without making a separately proved infringement a stated prerequisite in that clause. Section 3, PDF 6, includes CDNs, hosting, payments, domain registrars/registries, advertising networks and app stores among intermediaries. This is a broad business-customer proposal, not a requirement for government ID or age checks on every consumer. BPI's proposed information access for legitimate rightsholder enforcement also deserves distinction from publication of every customer's details.
The CIC briefing's Q3–5, PDF 12–13 of the MPA submission, extends across interactive platforms, content delivery, hosting/CDNs, registrars/registries, DNS, proxies, email, financial and advertising services. Privacy-protection companies would themselves have duties rather than count as the end customer. Failure or inability to verify the commercial customer would require service cessation; direct obligations and financial penalties would coexist with existing liability privileges. This is a briefing from listed rightsholders on the IP subgroup, not demonstrated approval by the full CIC or government. Its September 2021 dating/tabling is attributed through MPA's later submission. Main §26 asks the Lords to encourage BEIS, DCMS, Home Office, Treasury and Justice into the proposed forum. Commercial customers need not be incorporated companies; sole traders or commercial social-media users are not expressly excluded. The inspected demand sections supply no detailed challenge procedure for an unsuccessful verification.
Three distinct relations are now supported: named organizations submitted identifiable proposals; the CMA and parliamentary sites published them; and proponents cited and sought action through government policy processes. The MPA carries an earlier rightsholder briefing into its later fraud evidence. Those are actual document paths, stronger than a shared vocabulary or contemporary roster. They still do not prove whose argument caused a later decision.
The retained IPO 2022 strategy, under the cross-departmental policy discussion, calls KYBC an industry-developed potential solution and says action requires departmental collaboration. The accepted IPO 2022/23 account reports forum meetings. They do not name the Alliance as originator. This pass makes the chronology possible without filling that attribution gap. The undated current Alliance webpage can now be compared with its dated 2020/2021 positions; it cannot establish the date of the webpage itself.
The strongest rival to an Alliance-led causal account is convergent advocacy by several rightsholder groups, drawing on existing identity/enforcement ideas and approaching multiple forums. Root's separate research-input.md examines the explicitly cited RUSI input. No EU legislative survey, corporate genealogy or new agency branch was pursued here. The MPA's annex references to other reports and coalitions are references by the submitter, not independent verification of each underlying publication. Industry case allegations were not adopted as verified findings about the named services.
The remaining discriminating records are recipient minutes or correspondence identifying which paper was considered; the CIC subgroup's tabling/adoption record; and a government decision that accepts, narrows or rejects specific verification, service-cessation and sanction features. Root/Linnaeus own the disposition comparison. This packet does not infer enacted duties from any submission, a pilot-funded priority or a universal consumer-identification rule.
origins-captures.json records exact URLs, hashes, dates and read scopes. Two original CMA-published PDFs and the original CMA index HTML are retained. Alliance's four-page response was read in full; BPI was read at the recorded sections, not all nineteen pages. Local renders of Alliance PDF 3 and BPI PDF 17 were visually inspected and agree with the decisive extracted text. BPI's public file identifies itself as a redacted version; no unredacted counterpart was sought.
The two parliamentary PDF preservation GETs returned 403. Their working public readers supplied the substantive text; the error HTML is not the source document. MPA's PDF reader exposes the Annex 1 and summary text absent from the HTML rendition, but a single batched screenshot request for PDF pages 8, 9, 12 and 13 returned Cache miss. No image inspection or original-byte custody is asserted for those documents, and the routes were not retried. origins-reader-scopes.json preserves the exact reading boundaries and locator notes; it is a derivative, not a facsimile.
Acquisition closed at this dated-submission/transmission breakpoint. No case, atlas, ZIP, current-work or forest file was changed.