9 September 2026. Root acquisition closed. This lane compares named donor grants with actions by their recipients; it does not claim a grant paid for a particular action. The Digital Freedom Fund lane is separate.
Oak's retained 2025 Annual Report, PDF/printed25, lists Statewatch USD303622 over three years for news, information and analysis on EU spending and justice/home-affairs practice. It lists Digital Freedom Fund USD631579 over three years in core support for the European digital-rights community. Root read PDF22–26 and visually checked the complete page25 columns. These are reported grant amounts and durations; exact contracting entities, start/end dates, payment timing and conditions are absent. The Statewatch entry does not say unrestricted core support. [Donor report](http[local research file] is reused from the preceding Oak packet, not a second confirmation.
The same donor's current International Human Rights programme sets priorities that include reliable information, media pluralism, an open and accountable digital sphere, and protection for human-rights defenders. It explicitly allows intermediary organisations in some geographies. This provides a programme-level rationale that could accommodate watchdogs and opponents of excessive surveillance. It supplies no specific grant-approval chain or direction to Statewatch. Root read the complete substantive programme section in the official reader and retained original HTML. [Programme](http[local research file]
Statewatch's dated 13 September 2023 statement identifies itself as a signatory to an EDRi-coordinated call for EU governments to reject the proposed Child Sexual Abuse Regulation until it protects rights and security. The statement objects to blanket scanning of private communications and potential ID checks, on privacy, encryption and exclusion grounds. Those are the signatories' claims about the then proposal; this comparison does not independently resolve every legal or technical assertion or establish the current 2026 text. [Signed statement](http[local research file] Root read the substantive statement and signatory list, including Statewatch. It predates the 2025 grant: the later grant cannot explain the origin of this 2023 position.
For the comparator, root refreshed existing case source src-12639f108d96 and read all four pages of the WeProtect Secretariat's original EC consultation submission. It strongly supports the legislative initiative, mandatory detection obligations and a new EU centre, alongside safeguards, constrained information extraction, oversight and classification standards. It also expresses interest in collaborating with the proposed centre. The undated document gives membership figures as of 12 September 2022; this is not an exact submission date. PDF4 explicitly separates Secretariat views from members' positions. [Submission](http[local research file]
These are different positions on the same legislative initiative at different dates, with potentially different draft versions. Both invoke rights and safeguards; they disagree over whether the proposed detection regime merits support. Do not turn this into a vote on identical final clauses, a position held by every WeProtect member, or proof Oak financed opposition and support simultaneously. Current case relationship n25 already records the supporting submission; the fresh original improves its source custody. The imported source's access_state had remained discovered despite the relationship's historical read note; this new scoped reread supplies explicit current evidence for later integration.
Statewatch also signed an Open Rights Group-coordinated letter to Ofcom, Meta, Alphabet, X and ByteDance, dated 4 August 2025 on the signatory publisher's page. The retained five-page PDF identifies ORG on its letterhead and Statewatch on PDF5. It seeks clarification and safeguards against over-removing lawful political expression under the OSA following Palestine Action's proscription: clear guidance, transparency, impact assessment, appeal/restoration processes, conditional independent dispute resolution, and clarity on global versus UK removal. These are requested protections, not demonstrated remedies or acquired regulatory commitments. [Publisher's letter page](http[local research file] [attached PDF](http[local research file]
Root read the whole PDF and substantive HTML, and visually checked PDF5. Its characterisations of legal powers, particular detentions and the regulator's bypass strategy remain attributed assertions here; no independent legal/current-proscription audit was performed. The PDF itself has no extracted date; the date comes from the publisher. The 2026/04 URL path is a hosting path, not the letter date. The PDF lists D3 Portugal, absent from the current page's signatory text, so do not claim exact signatory-list identity. Statewatch appears in both. No sent-mail evidence, recipient reply or implemented correction was acquired. The date coincides with the separately evidenced DSIT/Ofcom meeting; a shared date alone supplies no connection between that meeting and this letter.
A common Oak funding node connects organisations that have publicly advocated different boundaries on digital power. This supports a model with recipient agency, differing programme objectives and contest over implementation. It weakens a uniform-policy inference from shared funding alone. It neither erases selection/renewal leverage nor proves all recipients independent in every decision. Statewatch's UK letter is critical engagement seeking constrained enforcement and remedies, not evidence it rejects all online-safety regulation or every form of age assurance. The sharper questions are which decisions a funder can approve, which decisions intermediaries allocate elsewhere, and whose proposed controls are actually adopted.
Finite acquisition: two Statewatch intervention records and one already-cited WeProtect comparator. The Statewatch month-index reader returned a challenge; an indexed direct article supplied a valid source and original. PDF reader cache fetch failed once; ordinary publisher GET succeeded. No bypass, account, outreach or broad genealogy. Original HTML/PDF bytes, their derived text, rendered pages and exact hashes are preserved in root-captures.json. Root has not searched for a response to this letter in this run.