Who acts on a crisis—and who records it

External and internal crisis indicators → may inform a provider determination → Providers within crisis-measure scope

External and internal signals can inform the provider, including NGOs without trusted-flagger status. No named NGO is selected, and no indicator automatically activates a crisis.

Providers within crisis-measure scope → determines activation using relevant criteria → Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026

The provider determines a crisis and chooses systems; action is as soon as reasonably practicable. A ministerial public statement notice is considered alongside indicators, not an automatic switch.

Providers within crisis-measure scope → assembles a sufficiently senior cross-functional team → Provider senior cross-functional crisis team

The recommendation places operational coordination inside a provider-selected senior cross-functional team; no public appointment of a named NGO or government officer into it is established.

Providers within crisis-measure scope → would operate a conditional incoming-information channel → Dedicated crisis law-enforcement channel

The channel is for fast crisis information into large services. Existing legal processes for routine data requests remain; Ofcom disclaims general power here to compel disclosure to police.

Providers within crisis-measure scope → would retain post-crisis analysis and key records → Provider post-crisis analysis and retained records

The statement recommends ending the protocol when criteria end or at90days, sooner, then analysis/records. Continuing risks shift to ordinary operations; this is not a90-day restoration promise.

Ofcom → may seek records for supervision → Provider post-crisis analysis and retained records

Providers retain records and Ofcom may seek them or ask about activation; no universal routine public/submitted ledger was adopted. No particular suppressed record or request is established.

Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026 → retains existing appeal, expression and privacy safeguards → Existing moderation appeals, expression and privacy safeguards

Existing moderation/reporting/appeal, privacy and expression protections remain; no free-standing universal crisis appeal is created. Accuracy safeguards coexist with acknowledged possible false positives.

Ofcom → published crisis protocol recommendations → Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026

2026-06-09 – 2026-06-09

Ofcom's9June2026 statement sets a crisis framework; laid draft and later issue/commencement remain separate stages. No current activation is inferred.

Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026 → recommends criteria-based crisis processes → Providers within crisis-measure scope

Providers use seriousUK-public-safety and relevant illegal/child-harm content indicators to determine a crisis, including linked overseas/local events. The framework is not a free-standing general misinformation intervention power.

Ofcom → may require threat-response information → Providers within crisis-measure scope

Under s175(5), Ofcom may use the public statement notice or a subsequent notice to require information needed to respond to the threat. Actual information demanded and ensuing provider behavior remain unknown.

Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026 → recommends a dedicated channel for large services → Dedicated crisis law-enforcement channel

Large in-scope services should provide a dedicated law-enforcement channel after their own crisis determination. Smaller high-risk protocol scope does not automatically carry this channel requirement.

Ofcom → declined extending formal crisis-contact obligations to NGOs/fact-checkers → Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026

2026-06-09 – 2026-06-09

The statement records requests for formal contacts and real-time access, encourages relevant collaboration, but declines extending formal contact obligations beyond police. This is a class-level disposition, not proof that every Full Fact data-access demand was individually resolved.