Money. Identity. Technology.
Follow the money. Find the decision.
Operational decision-makers applying crisis criteria to their own services
These are the service providers within Ofcom's crisis-measure scope, represented as a regulated role rather than identified deployments. Service size and risk affect the recommended obligations, including whether a dedicated police channel is required.
The statement permits internal and external signals, including NGO information without trusted-flagger status. Providers select a senior cross-functional team and choose their response systems. Large-service police channels facilitate incoming crisis information without replacing ordinary legal processes for routine data requests. The recommended protocol ends when criteria cease or at ninety days, whichever is sooner, followed by analysis and records. Continuing risks return to ordinary operations; ninety days is not a promise to restore all restricted content.
Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026 → Providers within crisis-measure scope
Providers use seriousUK-public-safety and relevant illegal/child-harm content indicators to determine a crisis, including linked overseas/local events. The framework is not a free-standing general misinformation intervention power.
Ofcom → Providers within crisis-measure scope
Under s175(5), Ofcom may use the public statement notice or a subsequent notice to require information needed to respond to the threat. Actual information demanded and ensuing provider behavior remain unknown.
Providers within crisis-measure scope → Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026
The provider determines a crisis and chooses systems; action is as soon as reasonably practicable. A ministerial public statement notice is considered alongside indicators, not an automatic switch.
Providers within crisis-measure scope → Provider post-crisis analysis and retained records
The statement recommends ending the protocol when criteria end or at90days, sooner, then analysis/records. Continuing risks shift to ordinary operations; this is not a90-day restoration promise.
Providers within crisis-measure scope → Provider senior cross-functional crisis team
The recommendation places operational coordination inside a provider-selected senior cross-functional team; no public appointment of a named NGO or government officer into it is established.
Providers within crisis-measure scope → Dedicated crisis law-enforcement channel
The channel is for fast crisis information into large services. Existing legal processes for routine data requests remain; Ofcom disclaims general power here to compel disclosure to police.
External and internal crisis indicators → Providers within crisis-measure scope
External and internal signals can inform the provider, including NGOs without trusted-flagger status. No named NGO is selected, and no indicator automatically activates a crisis.
Section175 public statement / information notice → Providers within crisis-measure scope
A public statement notice requires the provider to describe steps taken in response to the threat by the specified date; publication is not itself a takedown command.
Crisis authority: inputs, decisions and the record left behind ↗
UK age assurance: statutory chain and consequential choices ↗
Section 175 gives the Secretary a direction route through Ofcom. A notice can require a public statement and information. The provider’s criteria-based crisis determination remains a separate decision.
Open diagram →Signals inform the provider, which determines activation and assembles its team. Large services have a specific police-channel recommendation. Providers retain analyses; Ofcom can seek them.
Open diagram →Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026 → recommends criteria-based crisis processes → Providers within crisis-measure scope
Providers use seriousUK-public-safety and relevant illegal/child-harm content indicators to determine a crisis, including linked overseas/local events. The framework is not a free-standing general misinformation intervention power.
External and internal crisis indicators → may inform a provider determination → Providers within crisis-measure scope
External and internal signals can inform the provider, including NGOs without trusted-flagger status. No named NGO is selected, and no indicator automatically activates a crisis.
Providers within crisis-measure scope → determines activation using relevant criteria → Ofcom crisis protocol recommendations — June2026
The provider determines a crisis and chooses systems; action is as soon as reasonably practicable. A ministerial public statement notice is considered alongside indicators, not an automatic switch.
Providers within crisis-measure scope → assembles a sufficiently senior cross-functional team → Provider senior cross-functional crisis team
The recommendation places operational coordination inside a provider-selected senior cross-functional team; no public appointment of a named NGO or government officer into it is established.
Section175 public statement / information notice → can require a public statement by a specified date → Providers within crisis-measure scope
A public statement notice requires the provider to describe steps taken in response to the threat by the specified date; publication is not itself a takedown command.
Ofcom → may require threat-response information → Providers within crisis-measure scope
Under s175(5), Ofcom may use the public statement notice or a subsequent notice to require information needed to respond to the threat. Actual information demanded and ensuing provider behavior remain unknown.
Providers within crisis-measure scope → would operate a conditional incoming-information channel → Dedicated crisis law-enforcement channel
The channel is for fast crisis information into large services. Existing legal processes for routine data requests remain; Ofcom disclaims general power here to compel disclosure to police.
Providers within crisis-measure scope → would retain post-crisis analysis and key records → Provider post-crisis analysis and retained records
The statement recommends ending the protocol when criteria end or at90days, sooner, then analysis/records. Continuing risks shift to ordinary operations; this is not a90-day restoration promise.