Private classification and alert source feeding platform and shared-database workflows
Terrorist Content Analytics Platform
The Terrorist Content Analytics Platform is Tech Against Terrorism's service for collecting, classifying and alerting platforms to terrorist-content material, with related archive and application-programming interfaces. It combines in-house assessment and partner referrals with information that recipient services can use in their own review processes.
Classification, alerts and correction semantics
Its policies combine selected designation authorities with Tech Against Terrorism's consensus, threat and splinter assessments. Delisting follows removal from all followed lists, while historical pre-delisting material continues to be alerted. The Year 2 report describes 36 disputes about automated URL-availability status, with 35 changed; these are not terrorist-label reversals. Current hash interfaces separately document withdrawal metadata and feedback. GIFCT applies its own inclusion parameters to TCAP inputs. The older Altitude adapter receives URL-alert metadata and must not be treated as evidence about the current hash API's correction handling.
Altitude — inspected public implementation → Terrorist Content Analytics Platform
can return optional URL and decision diagnostics
2024-08-08 – 2024-08-08
Export requires diagnostics active and maps BLOCK to REMOVE. Selection uses the latest review in the interval without the inspected condition requiring published state or successful downstream delivery. This is code semantics, not observed false reporting or TCAP acceptance of a disagreement.
TCAP inclusion and verification rules → Terrorist Content Analytics Platform
sets inclusion, imitation and delisting parameters
Selected designation authorities combine with TAT consensus/threat and splinter assessments. Entity removal from all followed lists triggers delisting; historical pre-delisting material continues to be alerted. This is not a worked correction of a false item label.
Altitude — inspected public implementation → Terrorist Content Analytics Platform
treats TCAP as trusted in its confidence heuristic
2024-08-08 – 2024-08-08
Pinned code assigns confidence component 3 for TCAP or other qualifying evidence. Separate severity contributes to priority, so TCAP alone does not guarantee top overall rank. Neither confidence nor queue rank is a moderation verdict or calibrated probability.
TAT Trusted Flagger Platform → Terrorist Content Analytics Platform
advertises vetted partner referrals into the alerting workflow
TAT describes categorized partner URL submissions with analyst/AI review and metadata for platform requests. Five-tier/125-plus-platform claims are advertised capabilities, not proof of universal integration or mandatory takedown.
Terrorist Content Analytics Platform → Altitude — inspected public implementation
supplies URL-alert metadata in the inspected adapter
2024-08-08 – 2024-08-08
2024 adapter imports source identifier/report date, group text, flags, URL and availability. This is the older URL-alert interface; it is not evidence of current content-hash deletion handling or ignored corrections.
specifies archive/classification and moderation-workflow development
Two publicly described workstreams identify intended outputs. No cost annex allocates the contribution specifically to Altitude, the LLM, an API or a supplier invoice; no accepted milestone acquired.
Terrorist Content Analytics Platform → TCAP content-hash API — current public docs
requires prior onboarding for authenticated API use
Authentication introduction presupposes an existing onboarded TCAP or Archive account. It does not publish the current decision-maker, full eligibility contract or unrestricted access.
Two publicly described workstreams identify intended outputs. No cost annex allocates the contribution specifically to Altitude, the LLM, an API or a supplier invoice; no accepted milestone acquired.
Selected designation authorities combine with TAT consensus/threat and splinter assessments. Entity removal from all followed lists triggers delisting; historical pre-delisting material continues to be alerted. This is not a worked correction of a false item label.
December 2021–November 2022 reporting period, not a current API service-level promise.
Reported by the cited source
Year 2 report records 36 disputes, all automated status issues; 35 statuses changed and one remained active. These are not 36 terrorist-label reversals or restored user posts. Response target then was seven working days.
Report publication anchor; March relaunch and other activity occurred at separately described times.
Reported by the cited source
December update reports added archive files and sharing with about six large technology companies. No actual recipient roster, audit or correction case supplied; cumulative and limited-period counts are not combined.
TAT’s 2023 review describes the Microsoft pilot. No Microsoft-side acceptance, deployed model version, financial value or completed validation result acquired.
Authentication introduction presupposes an existing onboarded TCAP or Archive account. It does not publish the current decision-maker, full eligibility contract or unrestricted access.
TAT describes categorized partner URL submissions with analyst/AI review and metadata for platform requests. Five-tier/125-plus-platform claims are advertised capabilities, not proof of universal integration or mandatory takedown.
2024 adapter imports source identifier/report date, group text, flags, URL and availability. This is the older URL-alert interface; it is not evidence of current content-hash deletion handling or ignored corrections.
Pinned code assigns confidence component 3 for TCAP or other qualifying evidence. Separate severity contributes to priority, so TCAP alone does not guarantee top overall rank. Neither confidence nor queue rank is a moderation verdict or calibrated probability.