Investigative data and analytics infrastructure serving financial and law-enforcement workflows
Lighthouse
Lighthouse is ICMEC Australia's investigative data application for searching and analysing information concerning suspected child sexual exploitation and abuse. Its reported users and intended workflows include financial services and law enforcement. It sits between incoming suspected-activity data and professionals deciding what further investigation or action is warranted.
Delivery, reported scale and access boundary
ICMEC's 2024/25 report describes ingestion of just under eight million records, including more than 70,000 geolocated to Australia. Those are records, not unique people, proven offences or closures. Kablamo reports building the production application and providing continuing support. A 30 October 2024 symposium programme states an Australian-soil use restriction and limits the introductory session to specified professional groups. A separate AUSTRAC account attributes bank closures to Operation Huntsman; no acquired record joins those closures to Lighthouse.
The dated programme states use is restricted to Australian soil. It separately limits the introductory session to specified Australian regulators, financial/CSE professionals, banks/remitters and child-protection law enforcement. It does not establish current licence terms, access enforcement or actual participants.
ICMEC reports ingestion of just under eight million records in FY2024-25, including over 70,000 geolocated to Australia. These are records, not proven offences, unique people, alerts or account closures; suppliers and licence terms remain unnamed.
Report describes an operational application for searching suspected-CSEA data, analytics and links for financial-services and law-enforcement workflows. Data-provider contracts, user access and account-action records are not disclosed.
Lighthouse product owner — unnamed delivery role → Lighthouse
reportedly made technical delivery decisions
Undated vendor delivery account
Delivery account identifies decision-making by an unnamed product owner. It does not identify budget approval, intelligence thresholds, bank action or policy clearance rights.
Vendor describes ten active build weeks and four months from onboarding to launch. Calendar dates and independent deployment acceptance are unverified.
Lighthouse: the application, its operating support and the missing decision record
The new evidence earns a named delivery/support relationship and a dated access restriction. It does not yet earn a Lighthouse-to-account-blocking relationship. A separate documented closure operation is preserved alongside it.
No recovered record joins Lighthouse to those closures. That is a missing attribution, not proof Lighthouse was uninvolved. The candidate therefore creates a separate Huntsman operation and aggregate outcome, with no Lighthouse edge. The paper's closure passage derives from the AUSTRAC publication family; it is not a second independent confirmation.
The Australian 2024-25 impact report describes operational Lighthouse searching and analytic functions for suspected child-exploitation data, with financial-sector and law-enforcement uses. It lists Jodie Arthur both as a non-executive director and a Westpac financial-crime executive. This is a resource-plus-governance connection. It does not establish donor nomination rights, her vote on any policy, or a bank action taken from an alert. Provider licences, provenance, access agreements, correction rules and de-identified alert-to-action records could distinguish those steps without seeking sensitive underlying data.
Westpac's 2024 programme report records a $25 million six-year commitment beginning in 2021 for ICMEC data and knowledge sharing. Its Australian-project section names Lighthouse, a data application for banks and payment platforms, and Westpac participation in the SaferAI launch. The report uses both commitment and provided language; this is not a verified payment schedule. Its outcome footnotes explicitly say recipient information was not independently verified. The bank website's three-year grant description and this six-year programme description need the original agreement and amendments, not arithmetic invention. AUD is inferred from the Australian reporting context; the line itself prints only a dollar sign.
Report describes an operational application for searching suspected-CSEA data, analytics and links for financial-services and law-enforcement workflows. Data-provider contracts, user access and account-action records are not disclosed.
Vendor describes ten active build weeks and four months from onboarding to launch. Calendar dates and independent deployment acceptance are unverified.
Delivery account identifies decision-making by an unnamed product owner. It does not identify budget approval, intelligence thresholds, bank action or policy clearance rights.
ICMEC reports ingestion of just under eight million records in FY2024-25, including over 70,000 geolocated to Australia. These are records, not proven offences, unique people, alerts or account closures; suppliers and licence terms remain unnamed.
The dated programme states use is restricted to Australian soil. It separately limits the introductory session to specified Australian regulators, financial/CSE professionals, banks/remitters and child-protection law enforcement. It does not establish current licence terms, access enforcement or actual participants.