Where the proposal places decision rights
Paragraphs 226–227 recommend testing, sanctions and remedies, with launch blocking or withdrawal where systems pose an unacceptable risk to human rights. Paragraphs 231–233 propose compulsory access to powerful models and specifications for AISI: it would advise the oversight body, which would make intervention decisions. These are proposed powers, with legislation still to come. An existing body could expand and the functions could be combined.
What the records show
Human Rights and the Regulation of AI — September 2026 → Proposed statutory AI oversight body — UK
Recommends statutory enforcement powers
2026-09-14
Proposed powers include testing, sanctions and remedies, plus blocking launch or requiring withdrawal where an unacceptable risk to human rights is established.
Human Rights and the Regulation of AI — September 2026 → UK AI Security Institute
Recommends compulsory model access
2026-09-14
AISI would review powerful models and receive specifications under statute.
Joint Committee on Human Rights → Human Rights and the Regulation of AI — September 2026
Adopts committee report
2026-09-14
Formal minutes record the committee's adoption.
Joint Committee on Human Rights → Human Rights and the Regulation of AI — September 2026
Publishes recommendations
2026-09-14
Publication date on the report's cover.
Read the original source 1
What the connections say
4 relationships123Human Rights and the Regulation of AI — September 2026 → Recommends statutory enforcement powers → Proposed statutory AI oversight body — UK
2026-09-14
Proposed powers include testing, sanctions and remedies, plus blocking launch or requiring withdrawal where an unacceptable risk to human rights is established. Recommendations 226–227 and 233; the oversight body would decide, with AISI advice. An existing body could be expanded. No such power is enacted by this report.
Read the original source 1
4