9 September2026. Bounded root acquisition CLOSED after one original report directly cited by MPA's parliamentary evidence. This follows a specific source/input edge within the KYBC origins run, not a general RUSI or donor investigation.
The [March2021 RUSI Whitehall Report4-20, Taking the Profit Out of Intellectual Property Crime: Piracy and Organised Crime](http[local research file] by Ardi Janjeva, Alexandria Reid and Anton Moiseienko, names five co-funders in its Acknowledgements, PDF8/printedvii: UK Intellectual Property Office, Alliance for Intellectual Property, Motion Picture Association, Industry Trust and Premier League. It supplies no amounts, allocation, payment dates, executed agreement or funder approval rights. Industry Trust remains the source's label, without a new legal-identity reconciliation. The authors also credit primary information supplied by funders, PIPCU, BBC Studios and other named/unnamed organizations. Co-funding and supplying material are separate resource relations.
The same acknowledgment says findings and recommendations were independently reached and not influenced by funders. Methodology, PDF18–19/printed5–6, describes a targeted literature review, interviews with77experts between February and September2020, and primary-data review. Recruitment used literature, snowball sampling and invited self-nominations; interview categories include government, enforcement, providers, financial compliance, rightsholders/associations, protection vendors and academics. Two one-hour January2021 validation workshops excluded representatives of funders and prompted revisions. Some contributed evidence cannot be reproduced because of sensitivity. This establishes the authors' reported method and independence measures; it is not an independent check of all underlying interviews/data, a representative sample or a reviewed funder contract. The unreproduced material limits replication but does not establish fabrication or improper direction.
The executive summary and Recommendations, PDF82–83/printed69–70, combine several proposed mechanisms. Recommendation2 calls for an IPO/PIPCU public-private intelligence partnership including financial and online-service actors. Recommendation4 calls for business-customer identity recording/verification to the extent possible in the online-harms review, with compliance resources. Recommendation14 urges financial institutions to use named infringement lists when assessing exposure and taking appropriate action, including ending relationships or filing suspicious-activity reports. Recommendation15 urges providers to verify customers as best practice regardless of whether formal KYBC rules are introduced, qualified by what is reasonably possible. These are recommendations, not acquired regulator orders, provider policies or executed payment denials.
Other recommendations call for more financial investigation, acquiring-bank scrutiny and education of crypto-asset service providers. Those are particular anti-piracy proposals in2021; they do not establish later implementation, a general control system over spending or a stablecoin-debt scheme. The report distinguishes counterfeiting from audiovisual piracy and this scoped note does not import its piracy findings into every counterfeit-domain suspension. Its industry/consumer harm estimates and alleged case facts have not been independently verified by this root read and are not adopted here.
A specific downstream use is observable. [MPA evidence FDF0068, dated10May2022](http[local research file] paragraph18 and footnote12, cites this report's KYBC recommendation as support for action. MPA is also a named co-funder in the report. That establishes a co-funder citing the resulting research in parliamentary advocacy. It does not establish that MPA dictated the finding or that Parliament/government accepted it. Alliance's separately located August2020 submission predates this publication; the report is not established as the first origin of the proposal. The funding, inputs, publication, citation and actual government decision should be drawn as different edges.
The copyright/version page, PDF3, identifies March2021 and records textual changes on10and19March2021. Original retained root-rusi2021.pdf SHA25603d13de395767d5c5db7e5419ea60b6caa795e955468af7953814742dabbdce0,84pages,2164009bytes. Root read original-extracted PDF2,3,8,18,19,80,81,82,83; executive summaryPDF10–12 was read through the official public reader. Exact scope and derivative ancestry are in root-rusi2021-capture.json. An extracted page is not automatically substantively read. No facsimile/graph audit or full84-page review is claimed.
Root's MPA reading covered substantive main paragraphs1–28, Annex2 policy questions1–5 and signatory list, source date and footnotes through the official reader. Image-only Annex1/summary/case material was not visually inspected. Other returned case allegations were seen as source claims but not independently verified or used to establish ownership/criminal liability. Carver's separately scoped originals/reader custody and source chronology govern the origins packet. No operational content, accounts, inquiries or funder contact occurred. Acquisition is closed for combined review/forest.