Nova · 8 September 2026 · Bounded wave w1-australia
The missing public board sequence is now acquired. It documents responses, some changed procedures and retained limits. It also identifies a consequential boundary: Corby's declared exclusion covered testing and euCONSENT submission, while July minutes record his intention to review technical and vendor report sections. That is a question about the scope and operation of the exclusion, not proof of its breach.
The newly recovered decision trail
March meeting. The published ten-page minutes record objections concerning children, sample diversity, safeguarding and circumvention, with actions to circulate the safeguarding policy and arrange expert follow-up. The document likely corresponds to DIGI's March14 reference, but its cover says March13 and its body says Friday13February. Preserve those conflicting dates pending the meeting invitation or corrected record. [Original minutes, pp5–10](http[local research file]
April29 response. The next minutes report follow-up correspondence, a completed mid-project impartiality report, an eSafety boundary MOU, and introduced vendor-selection criteria. Scout Insights clarifies that recruitment uses its registered panel, not employees/their children. Whether this corrected a misunderstanding or changed a plan remains unresolved. A request to record parent-child consent conflicts was kept outside scope. [Original minutes, PDF pp3–4 and9](http[local research file]
June17 challenge continued. DIGI questioned the privacy comparison between independent providers and platform systems; participants challenged how practical testing would be described. The team reported all testing complete, while explaining that some technologies were assessed through documents/interviews. Minutes record a commitment to revisit wording. These are concerns and responses, not a unanimous endorsement. [Original minutes, pp5–7](http[local research file]
July8 review access. SAB received A/B/K; vendors received extracts concerning their own systems. Detailed C–J sections remained unavailable to the board during legal review. Corby committed to review B–J for consistency. Vendor replies were sought by July18. This establishes differentiated review access and a recorded intention, not actual edits or a recusal breach. [Original minutes, pp3 and6–8](http[local research file] Its control header also has stale dates/meeting numbering, so use the explicit July8 body date with the discrepancy retained.
Final methodology account. Part B reports changes from stakeholder feedback, including usability clarification and more realistic circumvention scenarios; it preserves exclusions. It identifies minuted ethics meetings and eSafety comments under the MOU. The stakeholder-response table derives from prior minutes, so it is not independent corroboration of them. [Part B, B.14/B.17/B.18, PDF pp52–55,66–68,74](http[local research file]
What can and cannot be compared before/after
The evaluation proposal is dated February6,2025. Its pp51–55 already describe usability and circumvention work with limits; this does not settle whether the planned coverage was adequate. Cover version0.3 conflicts with a history extending to version2.0. [Original proposal](http[local research file]
The human-subject protocol's filename says V1.3, but its cover, approvals and revision history have inconsistent years. Its history describes collection-notice revisions. We have the documents and reported responses, not a clean approved-version comparison; no change is attributed specifically to DIGI without the intervening record. [Original DOCX](http[local research file]
| Evidence stage | Current result |
|---|---|
| Objections raised | Original March, June and July minutes; retained DIGI letter. |
| Responses recorded | April decisions/clarifications, follow-up email identified, final response table. |
| Safeguards said to operate | MOU signed, selection criteria introduced, procedural/recruitment accounts. |
| Actual individual recusal operation | Access/assignment/signoff and conflict-decision records not obtained. |
| Approved before/after protocol | Public versions acquired, but inconsistent controls and missing intervening versions prevent reconstruction. |
| Independent outcome evidence | No independent recusal audit acquired; raw testing data not reanalysed in this lane. |
DIGI's April16 complaint remains an interested party's contemporaneous representation. Its members faced regulation and some submitted trial technologies. AVPA representation and ACCS's commercial certification interests remain on the other side of the analysis. Neither industry's stake decides whose criticism is correct. [Retained letter, PDF pp10–13](http[local research file] [retained conflict-register source](http[local research file] The latter was read from the September7 capture, not refreshed in this wave.
Procurement: evidence upgraded, tax/perimeter gap retained
An original departmental briefing now directly confirms contract CN4111198 at A$3,830,277, awarded November8,2024. It describes seven tenders and the department's selection rationale. Locator: FOI26-145 Document12, SB25-000302 version02 dated September24,2025, PDF pp87–88 / printed9–10. This upgrades the old e15 award edge; it is the same procurement, not another transfer. [Official briefing](http[local research file]
The newly identified FOI26-176 search index exposes this row under a GST-inclusive value heading:
| Contract | Supplier as indexed | Start | End | Indexed value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN4111198 | AVID CERTIFICATION SERVICES LTD AGE CHECK CERTIFICATION SERVICES P/ | 08-Nov-24 | 30-Jun-25 | 3,830,277.00 |
[Indexed official register](http[local research file] The full PDF failed retrieval, so this is still index-level tax/row evidence. The inspected briefing does not specify GST. No contract-payment total or consortium allocation is inferred; the broader A$6.5m programme envelope is a different quantity.
Acquisition, custody and stopping points
The official publication index timed out in the web parser; one ordinary public GET succeeded and exposed the linked originals. Captured files are listed below. No private collaboration system was accessed.
FOI26-154 returned a web error and its public GET timed out at35seconds. The independent FOI25-288 register copy returned a web error and timed out at15seconds. FOI26-176 exceeded the web tool's14.25MB limit; one ordinary GET timed out at15seconds. Each route stopped. The original [AusTender entry](http[local research file] returned403 and was not retried. Its link came from TenderTracker; the aggregator's inconsistent status and shifted dates were excluded.
The obtained public record supports a useful correction: a generic “safeguards were merely declared and objections unanswered” account is too strong. There were recorded responses. It also does not establish adequate enforcement, a representative achieved sample, or that reviewers respected the operative boundary. Separate regulator input, vendor review, advisory challenge and final authorial control instead of collapsing them into one committee.
The decisive next instruments are already identifiable. The secretariat/ACCS and Amanda Third hold the referenced follow-up correspondence; project leads hold approved revision history and task assignments. The ethics/impartiality function should hold the applicable exclusion decision and review signoffs. eSafety and project legal hold the signed MOU and draft comments. Scout Insights holds the recruitment specification and achieved-sample record. The department and AVID/ACCS hold CN4111198, variations and invoices. These are specific holder gaps, not evidence of refusal or concealed wrongdoing. No outreach occurred.
Files acquired
| File in this wave folder | Extent |
|---|---|
| australia-publications.html | Original index inspected for links |
| australia-march-minutes.pdf (+.txt) | All10 pages read |
| australia-april-minutes.pdf (+.txt) | Selected pp3–6,9 read |
| australia-june-minutes.pdf (+.txt) | Selected pp3–7 passages read |
| australia-july-minutes.pdf (+.txt) | All8 pages read |
| australia-evaluation-proposal.pdf (+.txt) | 88pages captured; selected control/method sections read |
| australia-human-protocol-v1-3.docx (+.txt) | Control, recruitment and collection-notice introduction read |
| australia-final-part-b.pdf (+.txt) | 138pages captured; selected governance, response, liaison and plan sections read |
Exact SHA-256 values, source locators, ancestry, failed routes and integration hints are in australia-candidate.json. Raw capture is not a claim of full substantive reading. The packet contains four new nodes, seven relationships, one proposed evidence upgrade to e15, and four parked holder-record leads. Alias retained source records by URL; do not double-count the same source, contract or derivative response table.
No canonical case, explorer, automation or other campaign file was changed.